By Dr. Jarrett Leplin (auth.)
This booklet proposes an unique thought of epistemic justification that gives a brand new technique to relate justification to the epistemic target of truth-conducive trust. the idea relies on a unique research of trustworthy belief-formation that solutions vintage objections to reliability theories in epistemology. The research generates a fashion of distinguishing justified trust from believing justifiedly, such that inerrant belief-formation needn't be justificatory while systemic deception will be. It thereby respects the instinct that criteria for justification needs to be available to the believer, whereas protecting the fundamental connection of justification to truth.
The research indicates how justification pertains to, yet is specific from, facts, rationality, and chance. It presents a unifying remedy of matters principal to present debate in epistemology, together with epistemic paradoxes, epistemic closure, skepticism, contextualism, advantage theories, the influence of good fortune on wisdom and justification, the translation of subjunctive stipulations for justification, the clash among internalism and externalism, and metaphilosophical overview of epistemological theories. There are additional functions to metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of technology, and ethics.
The publication will interact philosophers operating in epistemology or comparable fields, and their graduate students.
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Additional info for A Theory of Epistemic Justification
With probability the standard of justification, the lottery problem is introduced by making reasoning a justificatory process. One reasons from probabilistically justified beliefs, each to the effect that an individual lottery ticket will lose, to a conclusion whose negation is independently justified, and so to a contradiction. But any process that is justificatory in virtue of issuing a high frequency, short of 1, of true to false beliefs guarantees false justified belief. If all the outputs of a method reliable in the frequentist or probabilistic sense are justified, then some false beliefs are justified.
Running an errand leaving no one unattended (nor violating another trust or responsibility), I need no justification. It is not that my action is justified by the absence of responsibility. Justification is simply not at issue; there is nothing to answer for. I see two possibilities. We can reject the analogy of belief to action: beliefs are epistemic commitments that require justification; actions generally do not. 4 Much belief—perceptual beliefs, paradigmatically—are spontaneous, involuntary, unreflective.
I see two possibilities. We can reject the analogy of belief to action: beliefs are epistemic commitments that require justification; actions generally do not. 4 Much belief—perceptual beliefs, paradigmatically—are spontaneous, involuntary, unreflective. Only if they run into trouble or I put them to systematic intellectual use is there a need for justification. What does not work is to fault beliefs epistemically for want of justification while understanding justification on the model of moral accountability.
A Theory of Epistemic Justification by Dr. Jarrett Leplin (auth.)